

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 222141

12
ORIGIN SS-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /011 R

DRAFTED BY:S-S-O:GTWOHIE
APPROVED BY:S-S-O:GTWOHIE
----- 109478

Z 130915Z NOV 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USLO PEKING FLASH

S E C R E T STATE 222141

EXDIS, TOSEC 447

REF: SECTO 154

FOLLOWING TEL SENT BONN FROM SECSTATE12 NOVEMBER REPEATED

QTE S E C R E T STATE 222141

E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS: OVIP (SISCO, JOSEPH), NATO

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPER FOR MR. SISCO'S NOVEMBER 13
MEETING WITH THE NAC ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. THE OOST SEVERE PUBLIC STRAINS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OVER THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS APPEAR TO HAVE PASSED; SOME OF THE ALLIES INDIVIDUALLY, AND SECRETARY LUNS FOR THE ALLIANCE COLLECTIVELY, HAVE SOUGHT IN RECENT DAYS PUBLICLY TO STRESS THAT FRICTIONS HAVE DISSIPATED. PRIVATELY, IRRITATION CONTINUES TO PERSIST AT THE US ATTITUDE TOWARDS ALLIED CONTACTS. AT THE SAME TIME, NONE OF THE ALLIES HAS ALTERED ITS MIDDLE EAST POLICY AND THE EC-NINE ON NOVEMBER 6 ISSUED A MIDDLE EAST DECLARATION MAKING CLEAR THAT THE EUROPEAN ALLIES CONTINUE TO APPROACH THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION FROM A DIFFERENT ANGLE THAN WE. IN YOUR BRIEFING OF THE NAC, YOU MAY THEREFORE WISH TO BEAR THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND.

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 222141

ALLIED DISSATISFACTION.

2. ALTHOUGH MOST ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TEND TO BELIEVE THAT THE US HAS LONG BEEN TOO BIASED IN ISRAEL'S FAVOR, THEY HAVE

NOT CONDEMNED US MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY AS SUCH; INDEED, OUR DEFENSE OF ISRAEL HAS EVOKED SOME SUPPORT AMONG GOVERNMENTS,

OPPOSITION PARTIES AND PUBLIC OPINION, PARTICULARLY IN SUCH COUNTRIES AS BRITAIN, THE NETHERLANDS AND GERMANY.

3. THE FUNDAMENTAL ALLIANCE PROBLEM HAS ARISEN FROM THE FACT THAT THE EUROPEAN ALLIES ASSESS THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN AN ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT WAY FROM US.

(A) MOST ALLIED GOVERNMENTS DO NOT SHARE THE US PERCEPTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE; SOME ALLIES HAVE CLOSER LINKS TO THE ARABS THAN TO ISRAEL, AND FEW SHARE THE STRONG US POLITICAL AND EMOTIONAL COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL.

(B) EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST OIL HAS GIVEN EUROPEANS A SENSE OF BEING HOSTAGE TO ARAB POLICIES.

4. THE ALLIES ALSO HAVE FUNDAMENTALLY DISAGREED WITH THE US REGARDING NATO'S ROLE IN THE CRISIS.

(A) IN THEIR VIEW THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE ALLIANCE WAS ORGANIZED DO NOT APPLY TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

(B) THEY BELIEVE THAT CLOSE SUPER-POWER IDENTITY WITH RESPECTIVE MIDDLE EAST CLIENTS IS SELF-DEFEATING AND INCREASES THE RISK OF EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION.

(C) THEY APPEAR NOT TO BELIEVE THAT SOVIET ACTIONS SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 222141

IN THE AREA THREATEN TO UPSET THE BALANCE OF POWER IN FAVOR OF THE USSR; THEY BELIEVE THE US HAS OVERREACTED

5. DESPITE THE OUTCRY AT THE TIME BY SOME ALLIES, THE CRISIS IN RELATIONS RESULTED LESS FROM INADEQUATE CONSULTATION THAN THE EUROPEAN FEELING OF HAVING BEEN IGNORED, WHILE BEING EXPECTED BY THE US TO SUPPORT POLICIES IN THE FORMULATING OF WHICH THEY HAD HAD NO VOICE.

(A) THERE WAS SOME SPECIFIC ANNOYANCE THAT THE US HAD PLACED ITS FORCES AROUND THE WORLD ON ALERT WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION, MUCH LESS

CONSULTATION.

(B) IN THE ALLIED VIEW THE US DEMANDED DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT WITHOUT INFORMING THE ALLIES OF ITS OWN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND INTENTIONS.

6. SOME OF THE ALLIES, PARTICULARLY THE FRENCH, ARE PROFOUNDLY FRUSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE PLAYED AND WILL PROBABLY PLAY NO ROLE IN A CRISIS AFFECTING THEIR OWN VITAL INTERESTS.

THE US APPROACH

7. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, IT WILL BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO

8. ACKNOWLEDGE THAT DIFFERENCES HAVE EXISTED OVER THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, THAT WE AND THE EUROPEANS CLEARLY ASSESS THE CRISIS DIFFERENTLY AND THAT WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO INFORM AND CONSULT WITH THE ALLIANCE AS WE WORK FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

9. SET OUT THE RATIONALE FOR US ACTIONS SINCE OCTOBER 6.

(A) SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, US AIMS HAVE BEEN TO END THE FIGHTING SOONEST, BRING ABOUT A
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 222141

CEASEFIRE IN CIRCUMSTANCES CONDUCTIVE TO CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AND CIRCUMSCRIBE SOVIET INFLUENCE.

(B) DURING THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE WAR, US WORKED FOR A CEASEFIRE AND REFRAINED FROM RESUPPLYING ISRAEL.

(C) WHEN THE CEASEFIRE WAS NOT ACCEPTED AND THE SOVIET AIRLIFT CONTINUED, THE US HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO MATCH SOVIET SUPPLIES. A VICTORY IN THE MIDDLE EAST ACHIEVED THROUGH SOVIET ARMS AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT WOULD HAVE DRASTICALLY SHIFTED THE BALANCE IN THE AREA, ULTIMATELY MENACING WESTERN EUROPE AS WELL.

(D) FOLLOWING US DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AND ISRAELI MILITARY SUCCESSES, THE SOVIETS AGREED TO SUPPORT A CEASEFIRE THROUGH UN AUSPICES.

(E) THIS CEASEFIRE BROKE DOWN, THE SOVIETS DISPATCHED A NUMBER OF INCREASINGLY MENACING DEMARCHES WHILE ALERTING SUBSTANTIAL AIRBORNE FORCES AND THREATENED UNILATERALLY TO INTRODUCE SOVIET FORCES INTO THE MIDDLE EAST IF THE US DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN A JOINT EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

(F) IN THE US VIEW THE CONSEQUENCE OF A SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES IN AN AREA NOT CONTIGUOUS TO THE USSR WOULD HAVE BEEN SO GRAVE THAT THE US FELT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO PLACE US FORCES ON ALERT.

10. EXPLAIN HOW IN OUR VIEW THE PATTERN OF SOVIET ACTION RAISES THE REAL RISK OF UPSETTING THE BALANCE AND RADICALIZING THE MIDDLE EAST.

11. OBSERVE THAT IN THE US VIEW THE ALLIES DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE GRAVITY OF THE THREAT--ULTIMATELY AGAINST WEESTERN EUROPE AS WELL--POSED BY SOVIET ACTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND DID NOT ADEQUATELY SUPPORT THE US DURING THE CRISIS.

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 222141

12. STRESS THAT NATO NEVERTHELESS REMAINS THE CORNER-STONE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY AND THAT WE WILL STRIVE TO IMPROVE CONSULTATIVE LROCEDURES WHERE THESE FAILED.

13. POINT OUT THAT WE CONTINUE TO CONSIDER DETENTE IMPORTANT AND WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO USE IT TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR. IT WAS NOT OUR INTENT AND WOULD NOT BE IN THE FUTURE TO ESTABLISH A US-SOVIET CONDOMINIUM.

14. OUTLINE THE RESULTS OF THE SECRETARY'S VISITS TO THE ARAB STATES AND THE BROAD US AIMS IN WORKING FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

RUSH UNQTE
RUSH

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, ALLIANCE, ARABS, AGREEMENTS, BRIEFING MATERIALS, PEACE TALKS, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973STATE222141
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter:
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: P750026-0957
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731167/abqcejsd.tel
Line Count: 201
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: SECTO 154
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 JAN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <31-Jan-2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <07 MAR 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: OVIP, PFOR, XF, EG, IS, US, EEC, NATO, (SISCO, JOSEPH)
To: PEKING FLASH
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005